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Abstract
We show the unconditional security of decoy-state method with whatever intensity error pattern
if the intensity upper bound of decoy pulses and intensity lower bound of signal pulses are known.
Our result immediately applies to the existing experimental data.
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Introduction.— Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3] is a type of very important
quantum algorithm that can be used for secure private communication between two remote
parties, Alice and Bob. However, the standard QKD protocols such as the so called BB84
protocol [1] requests a perfect single-photon source which is a difficult technique. Most of the
existing set-ups realize the standard BB84 protocol through using weak coherent light as the
approximate probabilistic single-photon source. Such an implementation in principle suffers
from the photon-number-splitting attack [4, 5]. The decoy-state method [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] and
some other methods [11, 12, 13] can be used for unconditionally secure QKD even Alice only
uses an imperfect source, e.g., a coherent light [4, 5]. According to the separate theoretical
results of ILM-GLLP [14], if one knows the upper bound of the fraction of tagged bits (those
raw bits generated by multi-photon pulses from Alice) or equivalently, the lower bound of
the fraction of un-tagged bits (those raw bits generated by single-photon pulses from Alice),
a secure final key can be distilled even though an imperfect source is used in the protocol.
The goal of decoy-state method is to verify such bounds faithfully and efficiently. Recently,
a number of experiments on decoy-state QKD have been done [15, 16, 17]. However, the
existing theory of decoy-state method assumes the exact control of pulse intensities. In this
Letter, we study this problem and we present a theorem that immediately applies to all
existing experimental results.
Foundations of decoy-state method QKD.—We shall summarize the existing theory of decoy-
state method [6, 7, 8, 9] starting from the definition of the counting rate. Given a class of N
pulses, after Alice sends them out to Bob one by one, if Bob observes n counts at his side,
the counting rate for pulses in this class is
s = n/N. (1)
In some other literatures, the term of yield is used.
Proposition 1: If class X is divided into l subclasses and any pulse in X belongs to only
one subclass, then the total number of counts at Bob’s side due to pulses in class X must
be equal to the summation of numbers of counts due to the pulses of each subclasses.
If the fractions of pulses in each subclasses are a0, a1 · · · , al, proposition 1 is equivalent






where SX is the counting rate of class X, si is the counting rate of the ith subclass.
Proposition 2. If pulses in class X are independent and identical, the counting rates of any
two random subclasses of pulses from class X must be equal to each other given whatever
channel, if the number of pulses in each subclass is sufficiently large.
Proposition 3. If we have two classes X and X ′. Suppose y is a subclass of X and y′ is
a subclass of X ′. Pulses of these two subclass are independent and in the same state. If y
and y′ are randomly mixed and then sent to Bob, the counting rate of subclass y and the
counting rate of subclass y′ must be equal, even though the state of pulses of class X is
different from that of class X ′.
This is a direct consequence of proposition 2. Here pulses of subclasses y, y′ can be
regarded as one class, y ∪ y′. The state for pulses of y is identical with that from y′, all
pulses in class y ∪ y′ are actually independent and identical. Therefore y can be regarded
as one random subclass of class y ∪ y′ therefore Proposition 2 applies. Proposition 3 is the
heart of the decoy-state idea.







In the decoy-state protocol, Alice may choose x = 0, µ, µ′ (1 ≥ µ′ > µ) randomly at each
time, with probabilities p0, p, p
′ for each intensity and p0 + p + p
′ = 1. Pulses of these 3
different intensities can be regarded as 3 classes (sources), Y0, Y, Y
′. In particular, for x = µ,
the state can be written in the convex form of
ρµ = a0|0〉〈0|+ a1|1〉〈1|+ acρc (4)
with a0 = e
−µ, a1 = µe
−µ, ac = 1−e







For simplicity, we shall call pulses from this class as decoy pulses. In producing such a state,
Alice could have actually used three sub-sources y0, y1, yc with probability a0, a1, ac. These
three sub-sources produce states |0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1| and ρc, respectively. We can regard pulses
from each sub-source as a subclass, i.e., pulses from sub-sources y0, y1, yc are regarded as
subclasses y0, y1, yc of class Y (the decoy pulses). According to Proposition 1 or Eq.(2),
Sµ = a0s0 + a1s1 + acsc. (5)
Here Sµ, s0, s1, sc are the counting rates of all decoy pulses (i.e. all pulses in class Y ), subclass
y0, subclass y1, and subclass yc, respectively.
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with a′0 = e









d > 0, ρd is a density operator. For
simplicity, we shall call pulses of this intensity as signal pulses. In producing a signal













d whenever she decides to send a signal pulse. These four sub-sources produce


























d are the counting rate of all signal pulses (i.e., all pulses in class Y
′),




c and subclass y
′
d respectively. In the protocol, Alice
decides to use intensity 0, µ, µ′ randomly, therefore the pulses of all subclasses are randomly
mixed. According to Proposition 3,
s0 = s
′
0 = S0, s1 = s
′
1, sc = s
′
c (8)
where S0 is the counting rate of class Y0. Eq. (5,7) is equivalent to

S = a1s1 + acsc




and S = Sµ − a0S0; S
















Since Alice herself decides which time to use which intensity in the protocol, she knows
which pulse belongs to which class (Y0, Y, Y
′). After Bob announces those specific time
windows when his detector has counted, Alice can calculate S0, Sµ, Sµ′ by Eq.(1). Therefore
S0, Sµ, Sµ′ are known parameters in the protocol. In the case that the pulse intensity is
exactly controlled, actually only the parameter s′d is unknown. Therefore, it will be secure
if we find the smallest value s1 satisfying the equation above among all possible values for
parameters S ′. Obviously, the largest value S ′ produces the smallest value s1. So we only
need to set a′ds
′
d = 0. This is equivalent to the prior art result [7].
The unconditional security for decoy-state QKD with whatever pattern of intensity error.—
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In the above results of 3-intensity protocol with coherent states, the independent pulses
are assumed for each class therefore classical sampling theory works directly. In practice,
as a continuous variable, the intensity cannot be controlled exactly. There can be intensity
errors to each pulses in class Y ( decoy pulses) and class Y ′ ( signal pulses). Most generally,
the actual intensity of decoy pulses produced at different times are {µi}, i is from 1 to N , the
total number of decoy pulses; the actual intensity of signal pulses produced at different times
are {µ′i}, i is from 1 to N
′, the total number of signal pulses. The intensity errors of different
pulses can be correlated. For example, the intensity can be dependent on the temperature.
In a certain interval, all pulses can be brighter or darker than the supposed value. Due to
this possible correlation, neither the decoy pulses nor the signal pulses are independent, the
state of decoy pulses or signal pulses cannot be simply represented by a single-pulse density
operator. This makes it unclear on how to apply the classical sampling theory. Consider an
extreme example, the actual intensity of each pulse is 10% larger than the supposed one in
the first half of quantum-state transmission, 10% lower than the supposed one in the second
half of the transmission. If Eve’s channel transmittance is 4η during the first half of pulse
transmission and η during the second half of pulse transmission, overall counting rates for
single-photon pulses from subclass y1 (all those single-photon pulses from class Y ) is larger
than that of subclass y′1 (all those single-photon pulses from class Y
′). The ratio of these
two values is 1.023 if the supposed intensity for decoy pulses and signal pulses are 0.2, 0.6,
respectively. This conflicts with Proposition 3 because here y1 and y
′
1 are not randomly
mixed: the ratio of occurring probability of y1 to the occurring probability of y
′
1 throughout
the protocol is not constant at different time intervals.
To overcome this problem, our main idea is this: we can choose a subclass y˜′1 ⊆ y
′
1 and a
subclass y˜′c ⊆ y
′
c so that the occurring probabilities of a pulse from y˜
′
1 and a pulse from y˜
′
c
are constant throughout the protocol. We can then use the existing decoy-state theory to
pulses of three classes of Y0, Y and Y˜




Consider a virtual protocol, Protocol 1: At each time i in sending a pulse to Bob, Alice
produces a two-pulse (pulse A and pulse B) bipartite state




Here the first subspace is for pulse A and the second subspace is for pulse B. Alice keeps
pulse A and sends out pulse B to Bob. The value µ keeps to be constant but µ′i can change
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from time to time and any µ′i is not less than the constant value µ
′, with i from 1 to Nt,
the total number of pulses sent out. States {|zx〉} are orthogonal to each other for different
x (x = 0, 1, 2) and p0 + p + p
′ = 1. Later, Alice measures A pulse in ({|zx〉}) basis and she
can know which B pulse belongs to which class (Y0, Y or Y
′). State ρµ can be written in








































≥ 0 for all n provided that µ′i is not too large, e.g., µ
′
i ≤ 1.
















































are constant for whatever i. We don’t need the explicit
formula for ρie. To anybody outside Alice’s lab, Alice could have used a three-pulse (pulse
A,A′, B) tripartite state of
ρi(3) = p0|z0〉〈z0| ⊗ |z0〉〈z0| ⊗ |0〉〈0|




























and {{|vx〉|x = 0, 1, c}, {|v
′
x〉|x = 0, 1, e}} are all orthogonal to each other. Alice keeps A
pulses and A′ pulses (those pulses in the first and second subspace) and sends out B pulses
(the pulses in the third subspace) to Bob. Given this, we can define the following subclasses:
if Alice obtains her measurement outcome of |v0〉, |v1〉 or |vc〉 after measuring the A
′ pulse,
the corresponding pulse sent out (B pulse) is regarded as a pulse of subclass y0, y1 or yc,




















′. Given such definitions, the occuring probability of a
pulse from y˜′1, y˜
′
c is constant. Therefore we can use Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 for class










with S˜ ′ being the counting rate of pulses in class Y˜ ′, S = Sµ− e
−µs0, s1 is the counting rate
of class y1 or y˜
′
1, sc is the counting rate of class yc or y˜
′
c. In non-asymptotic case, the counting




1 = (1− r1)s1, s
′
c = (1− rc)sc and s0 = (1 + r0)S0.
Eq.(16) is replaced by


a1s1 + acsc = S
(1− r1)a
′















with x = 1, c ; N,N0 being the number of decoy pulses and number of pulses in Y0. The
possibility that the actual value of rx goes beyond the above ranges is exponentially close
to 0 [7]. The number of counts caused by a subclass cannot be larger than that of a whole
class and Y˜ ′ is a subclass of Y ′. Therefore N ′(a′1s1 + a
′
csc) ≤ N
′Sµ′ , i.e., S
′ ≤ Sµ′ . We can
then solve Eq.(17) numerically over all possible values of
0 ≤ S˜ ′ ≤ Sµ′ (19)
and pick out the smallest value of s1. Doing it in this way, Alice actually does not need
any information of which pulse belong to which subclass (She only needs the information
of which pulse belongs to which class, Y0, Y, Y
′). Therefore she can discard pulse A′ of the
tripartite state ρi(3). This means, she can simply use the bipartite state ρi(2) and obtain
s1 value through Eq.(17). Thus the lower bound of single-photon transmittance is verified.
This can be summarized as
Lamma 0: Protocol 1 is secure provided that µ′i ≥ µ
′ and Eq.(17) is used for the lower
bound of single-photon counts.
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Lemma 1: Alice can use Eq.(17) safely if she uses any source that in principle can be
produced through attenuating B pulse of state ρi(2).
Proof: Suppose in another protocol, Protocol 2, at any time i, Alice’s source generates a
bipartite state γi which can in principle be obtained through attenuating pulse B of ρi(2) by
a factor χi. If Eve can attack Protocol 2 effectively by scheme A then Eve can also attack
Protocol 1 effectively by first attenuating the pulses by a time-dependent factor χi and then
using scheme A. This completes the proof.
Lemma 2: Alice can safely use Eq.(17) if she actually at each time had used any state
Wi = p0|z0〉〈z0| ⊗ |0〉0|+ p|z1〉〈z1| ⊗ ρνi + p
′|z2〉〈z2| ⊗ ρν′
i




(Here ρνi , ρν′i are coherent states of intensity νi, ν
′
i).
Proof: Denote the (time-dependent) attenuation factor ωi =
νi
µ
. Construct a specific





and constant value µ for the bipartite state ρi(2) there.
According to Lemma 0, Protocol 1 with such a specific setting is secure since
ν′iµ
νi
≥ ν ′i ≥ µ
′.
After attenuating B pulse in each ρi(2) by the factor ωi, ρi(2) is changed to state Wi.
According to our lemma 1, Alice can use Wi directly and then use Eq.(17) for lower bound
of s1. Moreover, it is of no difference if Alice measures each A pulse in basis {|zx〉} in the very
beginning. If she does this, the protocol with source state Wi is changed into a 3-intensity
protocol with intensities 0, {νi}, {ν
′
i} and νi ≤ µ, ν
′
i ≥ µ
′, with probability p0, p, p
′ for using
each of them at each time. Consequently we arrive at the following theorem:
Theorem: The 3-intensity protocol is secure with whatever intensity error pattern of
decoy pulses (class Y ) and signal pulses (class Y ′) provided that:
1) the intensity of each decoy pulses is not larger than µ and the intensity of each signal
pulses is not less than µ′ (but not larger than 1);
2) Eq.(17) is used to calculate the lower bound of s1 in the range of 0 ≤ S˜
′ ≤ Sµ′ .
Our theorem here applies to all existing experiments immediately if the intensity upper
bound of decoy pulses and lower bound of signal pulses are known. In one of the recent
experiment [16], the intensities for decoy pulse and signal pulse are set around 0.2 and 0.6
respectively. There could be up to ±5% fluctuation to each pulse. We can safely assume that
the intensity of decoy pulses is not larger than µ = 0.21 and the intensity of signal pulses is
not smaller than µ′ = 0.57. We use the data for QKD distance of 50 km [19]. After s1, s
′
1
is calculated based on our theorem, the final key rate is calculated in the same way used in
Ref. [16]. The key rate decreases drastically with the increase of intensity fluctuation, as
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TABLE I: Unconditionally secure key rate (R) vs different values of intensities error upper bound
(δM ) using the experimental data in the case of 50 km [16]. The experiment lasts for 1481.2
seconds with the repetition rate 4 MHz. The three counting rates are Sµ′ = 3.817 × 10
−4, Sµ =
1.548×10−4, S0 = 2.609×10
−5 and the observed quantum bit error rates (QBER) for signal states
and decoy states are 4.247%, 8.379% respectively.
δM 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0
s′1/10
−4 5.090 5.284 5.472 5.654 5.831 6.004
R (Hz) 30.408 43.008 55.357 67.476 79.381 91.089
shown in Table I. The intensity fluctuation can be controlled less than 1% in the experiment
done by Yuan et al [18].
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